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Proceedings of the Annual Acquisition Research Program 
The following article is taken as an excerpt from the proceedings of the annual 
Acquisition Research Program.  This annual event showcases the research projects 
funded through the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School of Business 
and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Featuring keynote speakers, 
plenary panels, multiple panel sessions, a student research poster show and social 
events, the Annual Acquisition Research Symposium offers a candid environment 
where high-ranking Department of Defense (DoD) officials, industry officials, 
accomplished faculty and military students are encouraged to collaborate on finding 
applicable solutions to the challenges facing acquisition policies and processes within 
the DoD today.  By jointly and publicly questioning the norms of industry and academia, 
the resulting research benefits from myriad perspectives and collaborations which can 
identify better solutions and practices in acquisition, contract, financial, logistics and 
program management. 
For further information regarding the Acquisition Research Program, electronic 
copies of additional research, or to learn more about becoming a sponsor, please visit 
our program website at: 
www.acquistionresearch.org  
For further information on or to register for the next Acquisition Research 
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1. Introduction 
The US Department of Defense (DoD) is in the process of radical transformation—
transformation to a national security strategy predicated on joint Service purchases and 
complex System-of-Systems (SoS) capabilities.1 This paper contributes to a broader study that 
eventually needs to be conducted to evaluate the benefits and costs of increased reliance on 
joint Service SoS programs.  
The DoD’s increasing emphasis on joint Service SoS capabilities has created both 
opportunities and challenges for materiel acquisition. In terms of improving the effectiveness of 
warfighting capabilities, the opportunity exists for joint, interoperable, multi-function, multi-
mission systems that leverage information dominance and improve decisions and outcomes by 
making US and coalition forces not only better informed, but more coordinated, faster and more 
adaptive. In terms of efficiencies, multiple opportunities exist for joint programs to cut “economic 
production costs”—for instance, by reducing duplication, by exploiting learning curves, and by 
achieving economies of scale and scope in manufacturing, and in operations and support 
activities (e.g., joint training and logistics).  
However, there is a dark side. A key barrier needs to be overcome for the DoD to 
achieve the promises of joint Service SoS programs. This involves the challenge of “transaction 
(coordination and motivation) costs.” These are the less visible, but nonetheless significant, 
costs of negotiating, managing and monitoring transactions.  
                                                
1 As defined in the DoD Defense Acquisition Guidebook (2004), an SoS is “a set or arrangement of 
systems that results when independent and useful systems are integrated into a larger system that 
delivers unique capabilities.” Joint Program Management is defined as “Any defense acquisition system 
[…] or technology program that involves formal management or funding by more than one DoD 
Component during any phase of a system’s life cycle” (DAU, 2004, p.1). DoD Directive 5000.1, The 
Defense Acquisition System, dated 12 May 2003, indicates a policy preference for joint development 
programs over Component-unique development programs (USD(AT&L). 
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There are a variety of categories of joint Service programs. These range from relatively 
simple, single-system, single-Service programs to which other Services sign on to use the end 
product, to fully integrated, multi-Service SoS programs. Examples of the latter include the Joint 
Strike Fighter (JSF) and the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS). Clearly, 
the latter (joint Service SoS) acquisitions are considerably more challenging than the former. 
The reason can be traced to greater interdependence, manifested in greater complexity and 
uncertainty.  
Joint Service SoS acquisitions involve more stakeholders, multiple users and funding 
sources, divergent and competing requirements, and conflicting objectives that lead to difficult 
and contentious tradeoffs, diffused authority, negotiated budget arrangements, complex project 
management structures, etc. This increased interdependence is generally reflected in greater 
transaction costs: higher “coordination costs” from increased complexity and uncertainty, and 
higher “motivation costs” from greater asset specificity and limited market contestability.  
The higher the transaction costs, the greater economic production cost efficiencies need 
to be to offset them. As recently emphasized by Melese, Franck, Angelis and Dillard (2007), if 
initial cost estimates focus exclusively on economic production costs and ignore transaction 
costs, the result can be systematic cost overruns.  
According to a recent RAND study of major acquisition programs, the average cost 
overruns of weapon systems in the development phase ranged from 16% to 26%. Procurement 
cost growth over initial estimates averaged between 16% and 65%, while total weapon program 
cost overruns averaged from 20% to 54% (Arena, Leonard, Murray & Younossi, 2006).  
Since the official “acquisition program baseline” (APB) estimates for these programs 
reflect the best current understanding of the cost, schedule, and performance objectives at the 
time the baseline is established (typically at Milestone B decisions), Congressional funding of 
these programs represents an implicit contract with the Executive Branch. When incomplete or 
unrealistic cost estimates lead to significant cost and schedule overruns relative to expectations 
established in the APB, administrative sanctions, such as statutory (Nunn-McCurdy2) unit cost 
                                                
2 Since the law was enacted in 1982, Title 10 USC Section2433, a “Nunn-McCurdy” unit cost breach 
occurs when a major defense acquisition program experiences an increase of at least 15% in program 
acquisition unit cost or average procurement unit cost above the unit costs in the acquisition program 
baseline. Through 2006, the DoD had the ability to administratively change the acquisition program 
baseline for the purposes of unit cost reporting, and so was able to reduce the number of apparent Nunn-
McCurdy breaches, despite apparent cost growth that would otherwise trigger the Nunn-McCurdy 
sanctions.   In 2006, the Nunn-McCurdy law was amended.  The FY 2006 National Defense Authorization 
Act (NDAA) severely restricted the DoD’s ability to change unit cost reporting criteria.  As a result of this 
change, Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breaches are incurred at 15% (“Significant”), and 25% (“Critical”) above 
the current unit cost threshold.  Additionally, a “Significant” Nunn-McCurdy breach is incurred at 30% of 
the Milestone B unit cost threshold, and a “Critical” Nunn-McCurdy breach is declared at 50% growth 
above the Milestone B unit cost threshold.  Thus, the ability of the DoD to mask unit cost growth through 
changes to unit cost thresholds is restricted.   
The sanctions imposed by Congress on programs breaching Nunn-McCurdy criteria are noteworthy:  For 
“Significant” breaches, the Service Secretary must notify Congress within 45 days of the report (normally 
program deviation report) upon which the determination is based (normally a program deviation report 
initiated when the Program Manager becomes aware of the breach).  The program must submit a 
Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) with the required unit cost breach information. 
For “Critical” breaches, the Defense Secretary (usually delegated to the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) must certify to Congress within 60 days of notification that: 
 =
=
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=ÅêÉ~íáåÖ=ëóåÉêÖó=Ñçê=áåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ=======- 334 - 
=
=
breaches, can be triggered. In turn, these breaches can dramatically impact program execution; 
they also jeopardize relations between the Legislative and Executive Branches of government.   
A study conducted by the DoD in 2007 to develop a business case for improving system 
cost estimating in the DoD (Brown, Flowe & Hamel, 2007b) examined the cost growth of all 
major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) from 1995 to 2005 to determine the source and 
relative magnitude of cost growth and schedule breaches. See Figure 1.  
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Source SAR Data 1995-2005 All MDAPs
 
Figure 1. Cost Growth by Category for All MDAPs 1995-2005 
(Brown, Flowe & Hamel, 2007b) 
As shown in Figure 1, the largest source of cost growth as reported in the Selected 
Acquisition Reports (SAR) is “Estimation.” This indicates that estimates made in establishing 
MDAP acquisition program baselines were often in error, and thus program costs appeared to 
grow despite very little change in the objective content of the program. This “Estimation” error 
accounted for approximately $201 billion in apparent cost growth over the 10-year period 
examined across all major programs.   
                                                                                                                                                          
1) the program is essential to national security,  
2) there is no alternative which can provide equal capability at less cost,  
3) the updated estimates of unit cost (calculated independently by the OSD Cost Analysis 
Improvement Group) are reasonable, and 
4) the management structure is adequate to control unit cost going forward.    
Failure to certify within the 60-day timeframe will result in suspension of obligations for major contracts 
until 30 days of continuous session of Congress, beginning from the date of receipt of SAR/Certification. 
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Figure 2 is a related analysis that examines the quantity and sources of breaches for 
108 MDAPs over the same 10-year period (1995–2005). With respect to the Acquisition 
Program Baseline (APB), schedule breaches were the most common; occurring 244 times over 
the 10-year period examined, suggesting that multiple schedule breaches is a relatively 
common occurrence in many programs.   
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Figure 2. Breaches Reported by SAR All MDAPs 1995-2005 
(Brown, Flowe & Hamel, 2007b) 
Development and procurement cost breaches occur with less frequency than schedule 
breaches, but still occur sufficiently frequently that on average, each MDAP can expect to have 
one of each. Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC) breaches occur nearly as frequently as 
schedule breaches, indicating that the confluence of development and procurement cost 
increases conspire to increase unit costs at least 10% above that established by the APB. 
Nunn-McCurdy breaches are notably less common, suggesting that only about 20% of 
programs that breach their APB unit costs will grow substantially beyond that. Overall, the raw 
quantity of breaches indicate that expectations regarding costs and schedules are usually 
unmet, to the extent that for the 108 MDAPs examined, each breached on average more than 
twice for schedule and unit cost, and at least once for development cost.3  
This paper investigates cost and schedule breaches in a subset of MDAPs that includes 
a sample of 84 programs, divided into “Joint Service” and “Traditional” (single Service) 
acquisition programs, and “Single System” and “System-of-Systems” (SoS) programs. (The data 
is available upon request from the authors.) The results reported in Appendix I suggest there is 
                                                
3 This is not to imply that every program was equally troubled. A subset of particularly troubled programs, 
approximately 30% of the total, breached in some way every year they reported. 
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a statistically significant higher risk of cost and schedule breaches in SoS programs than in 
single system acquisition programs. Interestingly, while “Joint Service” programs in general 
have a weak statistically significant greater risk of schedule (and RDT&E cost) breaches than 
“Traditional” (single Service) programs, there is no significant difference between the two in 
terms of Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC) breaches or Average Procurement Unit Cost 
(APUC) breaches. (See Tables 1 & 2 in Appendix I.)  
Based on our sample, SoS programs tend to take relatively longer and cost more than 
single system acquisitions. This preliminary empirical evidence of cost and schedule breaches 
suggests initial cost (schedule) estimates of SoS programs may not be adequately capturing 
transaction costs. In fact, since production cost breaches are significantly greater, the 
transaction costs experienced by SoS programs may be overwhelming any potential economic 
production cost savings (Melese et al., 2007). If this is indeed the case, then the anticipated 
warfighting benefits of SoS solutions need to be sufficiently large to compensate for the extra 
costs and schedule delays experienced by these programs.  
Meanwhile, it appears that while “Jointness” contributes to schedule overruns, it only 
weakly contributes to development cost overruns, and by itself, does not explain production cost 
overruns. While our results suggest joint programs tend to breach their schedules relatively 
more often than single Service programs (“every event in a joint program takes longer […] extra 
time needs to be included in the program schedule” (DAU, 2004, p. 20)), joint programs in our 
sample only experienced a few more cost breaches than single Service programs in the early 
development (RDT&E) stages. There does not appear to be any statistical difference in 
production cost breaches (PAUC or APUC) between joint Service and single Service programs. 
One explanation for this is that the joint Service programs in the sample encompass a 
spectrum that includes both single systems and SoS, and that the complexity and uncertainty 
associated with SoS is so significant as to overwhelm any additional complexity and uncertainty 
that might be experienced by joint Service programs. Another possibility is that built-in checks 
and balances tend to offset the extra transaction costs of joint Service programs. 
For instance, “joint programs require special attention to multi-service funding 
requirements and to acquiring the right mix of joint expertise for the source selection process”; 
indeed, “full consultation and coordination with the participating components” is required (DAU, 
2004, pp. 12, 21). The ultimate outcome may be to help anticipate and mitigate the extra 
transaction costs, and to avoid requirements creep in production stages of the program. 
Guidance for joint program managers is designed to inhibit any changes in scope, stating that 
“substantive changes to […] program documentation, such as the acquisition strategy or the 
contract [need to be] negotiated with the participating Components prior to making changes” (p. 
12). 
With weapon system investments expected to capture a significant, and perhaps 
growing, share of defense budgets, unprecedented attention has been devoted to clarifying the 
determinants of risk, failure, and success in the joint arena (Pracchia, 2004). The defense 
department’s apparent inability to avert or even predict adverse program outcomes such as cost 
and schedule breaches is not only a source of external criticism (GAO, 2006) and internal 
attention (Krieg, 2005), it has undermined confidence in the time-honored practices of program 
management and oversight.  
To date, there is significant debate regarding the factors that influence the outcomes of 
programs. Thus, the search for root causes and potential solutions of program cost growth, 
 =
=
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=ÅêÉ~íáåÖ=ëóåÉêÖó=Ñçê=áåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ=======- 337 - 
=
=
schedule delay, and capability shortfall have received increased attention. To help explain 
potential pitfalls associated with joint programs, this study leverages “Transaction Cost 
Economics” (TCE), which has recently been applied to generate new insights into defense cost 
overruns (Melese et al., 2007). 
2. System-of-Systems (SoS) and a Declining Acquisition 
Workforce 
In 2003, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) replaced 
the “Requirements Generation System” that had identified warfighter needs for nearly 30 years 
(recently updated in CJCS, 2007, May 1). Providing a new, substantive role for Combatant 
Commanders, the JCIDS process reflects a significant shift in the focus of defense 
programming toward joint system capabilities. But an emerging concern is that DoD technology 
investments are becoming increasingly concentrated in very large, very complex system-of-
systems. 
In several recent cases, the size and complexity of undertaking SoS programs has 
overwhelmed the DoD’s ability to effectively manage them. According to a recent Congressional 
Research Service report, “management and oversight of acquisition programs increases as the 
value of the program increases” (Chadwick, 2007, p. 12). The larger the program, “the more 
difficult it is to sustain communications among staff members. In general, if there are “n” people 
in a program, the potential number of pair-wise channels is n(n-1)/2 […L]arger teams […] have 
a greater chance of communications breakdown” (DAU, 2004, p. 16). Ceteris paribus, the bigger 
the program, the larger the transaction (coordination) costs. 
Compounding the challenge was a steep decline in the professional acquisition 
workforce available to negotiate, manage, monitor and enforce contracts. The post-Cold War 
draw-down, and the Acquisition Reform initiatives of the mid 1990s saw dramatic declines in the 
defense acquisition workforce, with a corresponding “brain drain of organic government program 
management capability, particularly in specialized acquisition-related fields such as systems 
engineering.”4 The combination of the dramatically increased size and complexity of SoS 
programs coupled with a reduced DoD acquisition workforce offers one explanation for adverse 
programmatic outcomes that can be informed by TCE (Krieg, 2005).  
                                                
4 The consequences of this “brain drain” have been noted by Congress, such that HR1585 (bill as passed 
by the House and Senate) FY08 National Defense Authorization Act SEC. 852. DEPARTMENT OF 
DEFENSE ACQUISITION WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT FUND stated as follows:   
—Chapter 87 of  title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 1704 the 
following new section: ‘‘§ 1705. Department of Defense Acquisition Work force Development 
Fund” (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of Defense shall establish a fund to be known as 
the “Department of Defense Acquisition Workforce Fund” (in this section referred to as the 
“Fund”) to provide funds, in addition to other funds that may be available, for the recruitment, 
training, and retention of acquisition personnel of the Department of Defense. 
 (b) PURPOSE.—The purpose of the Fund is to ensure that the Department of Defense 
acquisition workforce has the capacity, in both personnel and skills, needed to properly perform 
its mission, provide appropriate oversight of contractor performance, and ensure that the 
Department receives the best value for the expenditure of public resources.” 
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To compensate for its declining internal expertise, the DoD devised and increasingly 
relied upon external “Lead Systems Integrators” to manage complex programs. Based on 
several recent, highly publicized failed attempts to outsource the integration of complex systems 
to private “Lead Systems Integrators” (LSI), Congress passed HR 1585 for 2008 defense 
authorizations, which formally issues a “Prohibition on the Use of Lead Systems Integrators” 
(Sec. 802). This effectively brings what are considered to be “inherently governmental” 
responsibilities (such as Lead Systems Engineer, Lead Cost Analyst, Program Manager, Deputy 
Program Manager, Systems Architect) back into the public domain by 2011.5  
To the extent the foregoing legislation drives the responsibilities and functions back into 
the public sector (versus simply reasserting Government oversight), it bears noting that 
vertically integrating the responsibility for systems integration within the DoD is not without its 
own set of risks. Transaction cost economics (TCE) suggests vertical integration leads to 
internal bureaucratic coordination and motivation issues. These include the risk of internal 
opportunistic behavior (costly lobbying for promotions or budgets), multi-tasking (“what gets 
measured gets done”), and sub-optimization (success achieved at lower levels at the expense 
of the overall success of the program).  
To mitigate these internal transaction costs, Kelman (2005) emphasizes three key 
features of a “bureaucratic organization”: “the extensive use of rules, hierarchy, and 
specialization.” (p. 10). DoD procurement activities are governed by several sets of federal 
government rules/regulations. For contracting, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) applies 
to the entire federal government. The Defense FAR Supplement (DFARS) applies only to the 
DoD. A subordinate set of governing regulations, outlined in Component-unique FAR 
Supplements, apply to individual DoD Components. Still another set of regulations, the DoD 
                                                
5 FY07 NDAA SEC. 820. GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE OF CRITICAL ACQUISITION FUNCTIONS. 
(a) GOAL.—It shall be the goal of the Department of Defense and each of the military departments 
to ensure that, within five years after the date of the enactment of this Act, for each major defense 
acquisition program and each major automated information system program, each of the following 
positions is performed by a properly qualified member of the Armed Forces or full-time employee of the 
Department of Defense: 
(1) Program manager. 
(2) Deputy program manager. 
(3) Chief engineer. 
(4) Systems engineer. 
(5) Cost estimator. 
(b) PLAN OF ACTION.—Not later than six months after the date of enactment of this Act, the 
Secretary of Defense shall develop and begin implementation of a plan of action for recruiting, training, 
and ensuring appropriate career development of military and civilian personnel to achieve the objective 
established in subsection (a). The plan of action required by this subsection shall include specific, 
measurable interim milestones. 
(c) REPORTS.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act and each year 
thereafter, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the 
progress made by the Department of Defense and the military departments toward achieving the goal 
established in subsection (a). 
(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) The term “major defense acquisition program” has the meaning given such term in section 
2430(a) of title 10, United States Code. 
(2) The term “major automated information system program” has the meaning given such term in 
section 2445a(a) of title 10, United States Code (as added by section 816 of this Act). 
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5000 series, pertains to the acquisition of materiel— derived from the 1977 OMB Circular A-109, 
Major System Acquisitions. Another layer of complexity is imposed by several provisions within 
Titles 10 and 40 of the US Code, which impose specific additional requirements for the 
procurement of information technology in general, and business systems in particular6.   
While these bureaucratic structures are imposed to address transaction costs, some 
argue the “cure is worse than the disease,” in that the layers of often obscure and conflicting 
guidance introduce new transaction costs beyond what would have been experienced in their 
absence. These transaction costs can be experienced as delays in procuring needed 
operational capability, in which case the “discipline” of the regulated bureaucracy translates into 
a lack of agility that imposes “time to market” penalties. 
In light of the competing requirements for governance mechanisms to mitigate 
transaction costs—arising from vertical integration versus requirements for acquisition agility 
and the dramatically increasing complexity of large-scale systems—acquisition policies and 
procedures are undergoing intense scrutiny for their ability to support joint capabilities (DAU, 
2004, Chapter 1, “Joint Program Management Introduction”). Many other changes are underway 
in the acquisition arena. Recognizing that single system acquisition methods may not readily 
apply to joint SoS capability-based acquisition efforts, the search is on for a clearer 
understanding of how various acquisition strategies either support or impede joint efforts. 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) offers a valuable framework to guide the way forward. 
3. Transaction Costs = Motivation Costs + Coordination Costs 
In business, two costs are typically factored into strategic acquisition decisions: 
production costs and the costs of managing the transaction—or “transaction costs” (Coase, 
1937). Conventional strategies tend to focus on economic production costs (input costs, 
learning curves, economies of scale and scope, etc.). TCE emphasizes another set of costs—
coordination and motivation costs. Economic production (opportunity) cost advantages tend to 
guide companies to specialize in “core” activities in which they have a comparative advantage, 
and to “transact” with outside suppliers to acquire other goods and services. A key contribution 
of TCE is to formally introduce and fully reveal the nontrivial costs of managing those 
transactions.  
Transaction costs include coordination and motivation costs, such as search and 
information costs, decision, contracting, and incentive costs, and measurement, monitoring, and 
enforcement costs. TCE predicts these costs will vary across weapon system acquisition 
programs to the extent there are differences in certain key characteristics of the transaction—
complexity, uncertainty, frequency, and asset specificity—as well as market contestability, and 
the choice of governance (contracting, etc.) mechanisms. A central point from TCE is that the 
choice of contract, organization, and incentives, along with key characteristics of the transaction 
                                                
6 Notably, the Clinger Cohen Act of 1996, 40 USC §1401 et seq., and 10 USC §  2222, Defense Business 
Systems: Architecture, Accountability, and Modernization, establish specific requirements for procurement 
of information technology that, in several key respects, differ from the procurement of weapon systems 
and other major defense acquisition programs, the responsibility for which is established by 10 USC 
§133, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.  The Clinger-Cohen Act 
effectively establishes a separate “chain of command” for IT acquisition programs, which runs from the 
Director of the Office of Management and Budget to the DoD Chief Information Officer (CIO), established 
by 44 USC §3506 as the “Senior official of the Department of Defense” for IT matters. 
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(complexity, uncertainty, frequency, and asset specificity) and market contestability, must be 
considered in order to obtain reliable cost estimates of joint programs (Melese et al., 2007). 
One of the key insights of TCE is that capital (and human capital investments) that are 
specific to a transaction (e.g., made to support a joint program acquisition) can generate cost 
savings, but also carry the risk of increasing transaction costs from opportunistic behavior. The 
role of relation-specific investments (“asset specificity”) is an important consideration that needs 
to be anticipated and factored into any analysis of joint Service SoS programs.7  
4. Motivation Costs: The Role of Asset Specificity 
Having made a specialized investment in location, physical, human, or other specific 
assets, a supplier often becomes the most efficient provider, which is good from a production-
cost perspective, but provides incentives for the supplier to look for opportunities to extract more 
from the transaction (perhaps by demanding steep prices for any modifications to the contract). 
After investments in specific assets are made, the relationship is transformed from a customer 
having the choice of a number of competing suppliers to a bilateral monopolistic relationship 
between a buyer and seller.  
Similar to “sunk costs,” investments in relationship-specific assets (“asset specificity”) 
are potentially valuable, but can increase risks to both parties in a transaction (Klein, Crawford & 
Alchian, 1978). Close-in bilateral bargaining (a principal-agent type game) replaces the 
competitive marketplace. This entails a transformation of the supplier from competitive bidder 
(prior to source selection) to monopoly supplier (after source selection), especially if there are 
no close substitutes. Accordingly, the customer (government) is now vulnerable to “opportunistic 
behavior” from the supplier.  
Unforeseen contingencies, combined with newly inelastic demand, may prompt the 
supplier to extract more of the surplus created in the relationship.8 In this case, suppliers can 
exploit their power in the relationship by renegotiating a basic agreement to their advantage, 
otherwise threatening to dissolve the agreement. The TCE literature refers to this as a “hold-
up”9 (Klein, Crawford & Alchian, 1978).  
                                                
7 Williamson (1996) identifies six types of asset specificity: 1) site, 2) physical asset, 3) human asset, 4) 
dedicated asset, 5) brand-name capital, and 6) temporal. These are specialized investments that 
generate high returns within a specific relationship, but offer little value outside it. Site specificity refers to 
the co-location of facilities to minimize inventory or production costs. Physical asset specificity refers to 
the use of customized assets such as specialized dies and equipment. Human asset specificity refers to 
firm-specific knowledge and skills (e.g., “specific” as opposed to “general” training). Dedicated asset 
specificity refers to additional investments in plant and equipment made to sell the extra output to a 
specific customer. Brand-name capital specificity refers to investments in reputation. Temporal asset 
specificity refers to investments that facilitate timing and coordination of projects (e.g., investments in 
critical-path activities). 
8 Williamson (1975), Besanko, Dranove, Shanley and Schaefer (2000), and others have labeled the 
transition from one prospective buyer and many sellers to one buyer and one seller, or from competitive 
market to bilateral monopoly, as the “fundamental transformation.”  To some extent, this transformation 
occurs after the completion of every military source-selection process. 
9 According to Besanko et al. (2000), a holdup problem arises when a party in a contractual arrangement 
exploits the other party’s vulnerability due to relationship-specific assets). 
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Conversely, a supplier (defense contractor) that makes specific investments in assets 
that are only valuable in the context of the relationship with a specific customer (government), 
can find itself vulnerable to any changes in demand from that customer (i.e., the supplier suffers 
from “demand uncertainty”). Given the government is the only buyer (or one of only a few) of 
joint SoS weapon systems, and given its limited ability to commit as a result of the annual 
nature of most budgetary processes, defense industry sellers often face a monopsony buyer 
that cannot make credible multi-year commitments. This leads to sellers facing substantial 
demand uncertainty and the real risk of strategic renegotiation.  
Whereas relation-specific investments can increase the total gains to both parties, the 
risk exists of opportunistic behavior; either party can hold up the other, for instance, by 
threatening to change the terms of the contract (e.g., the government’s sovereign right to 
terminate a contract for convenience as well as default). The danger is that if neither party feels 
it can recover the full costs of its investment in the relationship/transaction (say through a 
continuation or renewal of the contract—“frequency”),10 then efficiency-generating, specific 
investments will not be made, resulting in higher costs.11  
It is important to note at this point that whereas TCE has traditionally examined the 
customer-supplier relationship in the context of a contractual arrangement, the domain of joint 
capabilities acquisition is distinctive (though not exclusively so) in the establishment of 
partnerships among government entities (such as between DoD Services or Agencies), as well 
as teaming arrangements among private-sector enterprises within the defense industrial base 
(e.g., product development contractors and their first- and second-tier suppliers). These internal 
relationships also incur transaction costs related to coordination and motivation costs, search 
and information costs, decision, contracting and incentive costs, etc. This notion is explored 
further below. 
Whereas defense acquisition has traditionally focused on economic production costs, 
joint programs expose the DoD to the potentially greater costs of managing the relationship, and 
more importantly, to the risks of opportunistic behavior on the part of contracting partners—a 
critical “transaction cost.” Given the multiple competing stakeholders in a joint SoS acquisition, 
the principle of self-interest suggests all sides have incentives to behave opportunistically and 
may not necessarily have the motivation to cooperate to make cost-saving investments—
particularly when specific assets are involved, and information is imperfect (incomplete or 
                                                
10 In terms of “frequency,” past experience with similar programs appears to have a significant impact on 
a supplier’s costs and capabilities. So, if source selection and strategic partnership decisions recognize 
this and clearly favor past performance, the acquisition process will be converted from a one-shot game 
into a repeated game, allowing suppliers to earn a return on their investment in reputation. In this way, 
increasing frequency through strategic partnerships and recurrent transactions can mitigate opportunistic 
behavior and build trust in the contracting relationship. By identifying key characteristics of transactions 
such as frequency, and fully understanding their implications, decision-makers could mitigate cost, 
schedule and performance breaches.  
11 Scope for opportunistic behavior may lead to adverse selection, choice of an (ex ante) inferior option 
(or technology), or moral hazard.  Such scope increases risks that if a relationship-specific investment is 
made, the other party will exploit the terms of the contract to “hold them up.” For example, changes in 
specifications are frequently used by contractors as a reason to raise prices and profits under government 
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uncertain) and asymmetric.12 Clarification of the risks of “opportunism” (i.e., motivation costs) is 
one of the key advantages of TCE.  
If it turns out that joint Service SoS programs require a significantly greater ratio of 
specific assets to total investments, then this increases the risk of bilateral dependency and 
“hold-up.” Moreover, given the difficulty of writing complete contracts for joint SoS programs that 
will cover every contingency, with incomplete contracts the hold-up problem poses additional 
risks for the government—such as contractors charging excessively high prices for change 
orders, and strategic renegotiations.  
5. Governance Issues 
TCE suggests the degree of completeness of a contract is an optimizing decision by the 
parties involved, one that reflects tradeoffs between ex-ante investments in contract design and 
the risk of ex-post costs of opportunistic renegotiation. In reality, contracting offers an imperfect 
solution to opportunism. What may be required are additional governance mechanisms (rules 
and regulations, reputation mechanisms, termination agreements, government-furnished 
equipment, Government-owned, Contractor-operated (GOCO) facilities, warranties, etc.) to shift 
risks to safeguard and protect transaction-specific investments, settle disputes, and adapt to 
new conditions. Ex-ante efforts may also be necessary to screen for reliability and reputation 
(e.g., pre-award contract surveys of potential venders). These structures can include anything 
from agreements to share and verify cost and performance information through incentive 
contracts, to the careful crafting of dispute-settlement mechanisms (e.g., alternate dispute 
resolution, proactive management councils, etc.). Among government entities in joint acquisition 
programs, memoranda of understanding or agreement (MOUs or MOAs)13 reflect a “quasi 
contractual” relationship among ostensibly sovereign entities. The enforceability of these is 
always questionable, but they nevertheless serve to make the particulars of agreements among 
the parties explicit and provide both implicit and explicit dispute-resolution mechanisms to 
reduce the risk of hold-up. 
In general, the less complex and uncertain a transaction, and the lower the requirement 
for specific assets, the easier it is to write an explicit contract that covers all contingencies. Also, 
the lower the administrative and enforcement costs of that contract, the lower the risk of hold-
up. These favorable characteristics are more likely to exist in established, traditional (single 
                                                
12 In order to combat this tendency, and in the spirit of resolving the principal-agent problem, an 
interesting incentive clause is included by the US Air Force in its “National Polar-Orbiting Operational 
Environmental Satellite System.” When establishing top executives’ salaries and bonuses, the contract 
requires TRW’s corporate board to consider contract performance. By tying senior executive pay directly 
to contract performance, decision-makers can help align incentives, increase accountability and reduce 
cost overruns (Graham, 2003). 
13 The Air Force F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program featured elaborate memoranda of agreement 
among domestic and international partners to reduce the risk of hold-up.  Despite these structures, the 
sovereignty of partner governments limited the enforceability of these instruments, and hold-ups did 
occur—notably when the legislatures of the partner governments imposed changes to the agreements 
articulated in the MOAs, upon which program plans were based.  The consequential impact of program 
cost, schedule, and performance outcomes have not been fully characterized, but would be a worthwhile 
subject of future TCE research. 
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Service), single system acquisition programs, and contribute to lower costs (or cost overruns), 
and better performance and schedules. 14 
Evidence uncovered by Bajari and Tadelis (2001) in construction contracts reveals that 
in cases in which a transaction is easy to define and measure (i.e., there is little complexity), 
and only a few minor changes are expected (i.e., there is little uncertainty), fixed-price type 
contracts tend to dominate. However, the more complex the transaction—the more 
difficult/costly it is to define and measure performance, and the more uncertain—the more likely 
it is that a change in the contract will be required, and the more severe the adversarial 
relationships experienced ex-post when fixed-price contracts are chosen. In the latter case, 
fixed-price type construction contracts often end in costly renegotiations—in which any surplus 
generated was dissipated in the course of those negotiations through unproductive bargaining 
and influence activities. Thus, complexity and uncertainty can force parties to turn away from 
fixed-price type contracts and towards cost-reimbursement type contracts (e.g., costs plus a 
award/incentive fee), and to rely heavily on reputation and other enforcement mechanisms to 
avoid ex-post opportunistic behavior that threatens to dissipate the gains generated by a 
transaction. 
In reality, joint Service acquisition programs often involve highly interdependent, 
complex system-of-systems (SoS) that usually end up in a bilateral monopoly contractual 
setting.15 In this case, assuming no specific assets are required, the outcome depends on the 
degree of contractual ambiguity governing the transaction, as well as on any administrative and 
enforcement costs involved. However, as complexity, uncertainty, and opportunism due to 
specific investments increase, so does the risk of hold-up and so do the coordination and 
motivation (transaction) costs required to measure, monitor, and govern both the internal 
                                                
14 If a transaction requires little in the way of specific assets (no hold-up problem), and involves a product 
or service that is: a) well-defined and homogeneous, b) easy to measure (limited complexity and mild 
information asymmetry), c) routinely used (recurring/frequent purchases), d) not subject to change (limited 
demand uncertainty), and e) is offered by competing suppliers, then there is little room for negotiation 
(price and performance are market-driven), and the marginal benefit of unproductive bargaining is near 
zero. With little room for bargaining over such routine and uncomplicated transactions, substantial 
production and transaction cost stability can be expected in the acquisition. Moreover, since 
administrative, incentive, and enforcement costs tend to be low for acquisitions in more contestable 
(competitive) markets, the marginal cost of engaging in the transaction is relatively smaller for the military, 
and there exists an incentive for the supplier to invest in the transaction that generates opportunities for 
cost savings. International competition for standard (off-the-shelf) commercial components of weapon 
systems might be an example. By unbundling large, complex weapons systems into sub-systems, 
decision-makers might reveal opportunities to enjoy the benefits of lower transaction costs and greater 
competition, leading to lower production costs. These favorable characteristics generally lend themselves 
to more accurate cost estimating. 
15 Many factors conspire to create this bi-lateral monopoly. On the buyer side, monopsony power partly 
derives from the fact the military value of most systems depends solely on their performance relative to 
the systems of adversaries. This is specific to a country and the defense environment it faces at a 
particular point in time, effectively making it the sole buyer of a highly differentiated product. The 
appearance of a superior alternative results in what might be termed military obsolescence. Response to 
new threats can require redesign during development, and modifications during the system’s operational 
life. This cause-and-effect relationship conspires to reduce the number of buyers of a particular weapon 
system, since these weapon systems are often evolving products (spiral acquisition). Thus, in addition to 
technical uncertainty, there is a significant degree of demand uncertainty.  
 =
=
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=ÅêÉ~íáåÖ=ëóåÉêÖó=Ñçê=áåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ=======- 344 - 
=
=
relationships among the Components and the external relationship with the contractor. These 
less-favorable characteristics of joint SoS programs can discourage productive efforts and 
investments in both internal Component relationships and external contractor relationships, and 
thus contribute to more serious cost overruns, schedule breaches, and performance shortfalls. 
6. Coordination Costs: Interdependency Yields Complexity and 
Uncertainty  
Interdependency is typically defined as the degree to which the performance of one 
activity (or system) relies on an external activity (or system) for its success (Thompson, 1967). 
Under conditions in which organizations are allowed to seek the most efficient path to task 
accomplishment, interdependent relationships will be established as long as the benefits exceed 
the costs. Private entities typically make technology investments and seek interdependencies to 
achieve the benefits of synergy and economies of scale based on measurable effects on the 
“bottom line.” In contrast, government agencies are often guided and constrained by legislative 
requirements for cross-organizational integration to establish interdependent relationships. 
Consider, for example, the increased emphasis on “jointness” since the Goldwater Nichols 
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The intent of this legislation was clearly to 
increase interoperability, and hence interdependency, in the DoD. Combined with recent 
reforms that reinforce joint solutions to defense capability needs (such as JCIDS) and that 
simultaneously encourage SoS, the result is increased interdependency reflected in increased 
complexity and uncertainty, and correspondingly higher coordination costs.16 
For most systems, interoperability is pursued as a means to leverage the collective 
assets of various organizations located at different points along the value chain. For example, in 
the command and control (C2) process, military operations benefit when commanders can seek, 
synthesize, and disseminate several types of information derived from different organizations. 
Experts in a variety of areas must collaborate during the C2 process to effectively create and 
execute battle plans. These experts may come from different disciplines (or specialties), 
different branches of the military, or even different countries. In short, interoperable systems 
promote interdependent actions. In turn, increased interdependency is reflected in increased 
complexity and uncertainty and higher coordination costs. 
                                                
16 Interdependent activities are not new to the DoD or to government in general.  However, what is new is 
the scale in which interdependent actions are applied. Prior to the information technology revolution of the 
1990s, spatial and temporal distances tended to impede communication and the sharing of information 
among partners.  Hence, tightly coupled activities were generally restricted to small groups of 
geographically co-located groups where coordination costs could be minimized. The advent of advanced 
information and communication technologies eroded many of the spatial and temporal barriers that once 
thwarted collaboration. The potential benefits of information-sharing enabled by interoperability were then 
quickly realized and became a major thrust for many organizations, the DoD included. Network 
externalities were increasingly recognized—the value of the network to individual participants increased 
with the number of participants connected to the network. This refers to “Metcalfe’s Law,” which proposes 
that the value of a network varies as the square of the number of users or “nodes.”  The foundation of 
Metcalfe’s law is the observation that in a communications network with n members, each can make (n–1) 
connections with other participants. If all those connections are equally valuable, the total value of the 
network is proportional to n(n–1), that is, roughly, n 2.  The law was named in 1993 by George Gilder, 
publisher of the influential Gilder Technology Report. Like Moore's Law, which states that the number of 
transistors on a chip will double every 18 to 20 months, Metcalfe's Law is a rough empirical description, 
not an immutable physical law (information derived from Briscoe, Odlyzko & Tilly, 2006). 
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Complexity is a key component of transaction costs. When advanced (immature) 
technologies are combined with systems integration challenges across diverse organizations in 
the scale of joint Service SoS programs, the resulting complexity leads to higher coordination 
costs. Marshall and Meckling (1962) were among the first to discover that variability in the size 
of cost-estimating errors in defense contracts could at least partly be attributed to technological 
complexity, with larger errors associated with greater technological advances sought in different 
systems.17 
Uncertainty is another key component of transaction costs. The reconciliation of 
competing requirements of different players in joint programs can lead to design changes and 
implementation challenges (demand uncertainty). Similarly, the “free rider problem” (in which 
none of the players want to sacrifice their budgets to cover costs that might benefit others), 
combined with changes in Congressional priorities (political uncertainty), can lead to funding 
instability (budget uncertainty). Besides demand, political, and budget uncertainty, joint 
programs face measurement uncertainty, technological uncertainty, supplier performance 
uncertainty, etc.18 
An interesting avenue for future research would be to investigate if increased emphasis 
on “jointness” since the Goldwater Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 
or the advent of the JCIDS in 2003 has increased the complexity and uncertainty of joint 
programs relative to others and, consequently, raised coordination and motivation costs. The 
possibility exists that other characteristics inherent in many joint programs might offset these 
higher transaction costs.  
On the one hand, a joint program manager that manages a program that is 
technologically mature, that does not require strict military specifications, in which funding and 
requirements are relatively stable, and where a contestable market exists for the product or 
                                                
17 Adler (1995) examines the complex and interdependent relationship between product design and 
manufacturing, describing four possible governance mechanisms to improve coordination (standards, 
schedules, mutual adaptation and teams). McNaugher (1989) provides evidence that costs rise rapidly 
with system complexity, as does the variance of costs around expected costs (p. 128). Consider the 
increase in complexity in the US Navy’s new Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) class, which has experienced a 
128% cost growth and which was designed to avoid costs through smaller crews (substituting capital for 
labor). It is unclear whether the substantial increase in transaction costs and scope for opportunism 
introduced with the increased complexity (capital investment in complex onboard systems) justifies the 
anticipated labor-cost savings. 
18 A dynamic programming model by Womer & Terasawa (1989) finds that under demand uncertainty, a 
rational defense contractor must prepare for various contingencies, and will, for example, restrict 
investments in specific assets, which drives costs higher than they would be if demand were certain. This 
tends to increase information and contracting costs, and as the authors demonstrate, threatens 
investments in specific assets. The authors show that the higher the probability the contract will be 
canceled, the less the contractor will invest in capital equipment (relation-specific investments), which 
results in relatively more labor-intensive production, raising costs. Thus, demand uncertainty increases 
contracting costs and also raises issues related to asset specificity. Under demand uncertainty, the 
rational contractor will restrict investments in specific assets (such as capital tooling or specialized 
expertise), unless they are reasonably sure to recover these costs via overhead.  The allowability of 
“Facilities Capital Cost of Money” as an expense is a mechanism by which the Government reduces the 
risk to the contractor by allowing recovery of costs associated with specific capital assets (buildings, 
tooling, etc.) through overhead.  Critics argue this encourages Defense contractors to over-capitalize, 
which increases costs DoD-wide. 
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service, may in fact experience lower transaction costs. On the other hand, if the program is 
facing immature technologies, rigid specifications, funding and requirements instability, and 
monopolistic suppliers, joint program managers and other key decision-makers should 
recognize the potential for high transaction costs and opportunistic behavior.  
7. Conclusion 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) suggests investigating the specific characteristics of 
transactions that make up joint Service programs (like SoS) could help anticipate (and perhaps 
mitigate) cost and schedule breaches. Since increases in interoperability/interdependence tend 
to increase complexity and uncertainty, and complexity and uncertainty increase coordination 
and motivation costs, it is likely that cost and schedule breaches partly depend on decisions 
regarding the extent of bundling or unbundling of the many interdependent parts of joint 
systems,19 and on the particular phase of development or production of those weapon systems.  
Historically, fixed-price contracts are usually prescribed in later stages of product 
development when complexity and uncertainty have been resolved, and the contract is 
complete. In contrast, cost-reimbursement contracts are usually prescribed in earlier stages of 
product development when complexity and uncertainty have not been resolved, and the contract 
is incomplete.20 Today cost-reimbursement contracts are phased out, and fixed-price contracts 
phased in, as complexity and uncertainty issues are resolved. However, complexity and 
uncertainty must be characterized in the context of TCE for this strategy to succeed. Note that 
while these prescribed contracts focus on the characteristics of complexity and uncertainty, 
often overlooked is the vital role of asset specificity—a key component reflected in the 
motivation cost component of transaction costs. 
The main strategy of reducing cost and schedule breaches is employed to identify ways 
to cut coordination and motivation costs. Specific recommendations include: a) reducing 
complexity by investing in a more complete contract—e.g., setting realistic baselines (entailing 
higher search and information costs) or using more mature technologies (recently emergent in 
acquisition policies); b) reducing uncertainty through multi-year contracts (reducing demand 
                                                
19 For instance, an extremely complex interoperable system is envisioned for the Coast Guard’s new 
“integrated deepwater system program.” The system is intended to include cutters and small boats, a new 
fleet of fixed-wing aircraft, a combination of new and upgraded helicopters, and land- and cutter-based 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)—all linked with Command, Control, Communications and Computers, 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems and supported by integrated logistics. 
According to a recent Coast Guard press release (2007, June 25), “Deepwater is a 25-year, $24 billion 
effort that will produce more than 91 new cutters; 195 new aircraft” and C4ISR equipment. The lead 
systems integrator is a joint venture between Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman that has recently 
been in the news for major cost overruns, schedule slippages, and quality issues—the latter involving 
several modified ships that were determined un-seaworthy.  
20“Complexity” and “technological uncertainty” (as opposed to “demand uncertainty”) are usually 
correlated. Ignorance about what buyers want and what contractors can do result in large up-front search 
and information or Research and Development (R&D) costs. R&D is similar to a real option in the sense 
that real options models are learning models (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 2001). The problem that gives rise to 
high transaction costs in the case of complex weapon systems is that this characteristic of the transaction 
leads to market failure (missing markets). From a TCE perspective, the classic market failures—natural 
monopoly, negative externalities, public goods, etc.—have information analogues: missing markets, 
adverse selection, and moral hazard. 
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uncertainty) or investing in a more complete contract (reducing relationship uncertainty); c) 
increasing measurement (CAIG) and monitoring (GAO) of performance and both production and 
transaction costs to reduce information asymmetries and the associated risks of moral hazard 
and adverse selection; d) placing credible deterrents to bad behavior in place—such as penalty 
clauses, warranties and bonding; e) using multi-year contracts to gather information and to 
reward good reputations (Kelman, 1990); f) mitigating opportunistic behavior introduced by 
asset specificity through careful use of incentives, proper bundling (or task-partitioning) of joint 
programs, and strategic investments in government-furnished equipment or government-owned 
and contractor-operated assets; and finally g) increasing market contestability through 
investments in real options (e.g., government-controlled standby capacity—credible threat of 
vertical integration, or second sourcing—credible threat of entry).21  
We believe any evaluation of joint Service—and particularly SoS—acquisition programs 
would benefit from an analysis of the characteristics of the corresponding bundles of 
transactions through the lens of TCE. An inspired effort to collect and analyze data guided by 
TCE (as described in this paper) could help DoD decision-makers to anticipate and mitigate cost 
and schedule breaches and to avoid future performance shortfalls. 
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APPENDIX 1 
The 84 DoD weapon system programs first divided into “Single Service” and “Joint 
Service” programs by Brown, Flowe & Hamel (2007b) were further divided into either “single 
system” or “system-of-systems” (SoS) programs. (Data available upon request.) The SoS 
designator was used as a proxy for complexity. Of course, SoS programs are not necessarily 
joint Service programs. For example, an aircraft carrier qualifies as SoS, but is managed by a 
single service. Another example is the F-22 managed exclusively by the Air Force. Of course, 
“single systems” can also qualify as joint programs if they are either managed or procured by 
more than one service. The tests below focused on four categories of breaches: Schedule, 
RDT&E, Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC), and Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC).  
Because the subdivided samples were not normally distributed, we ran a Kruskal-Wallis 
(H) test to determine if there was a significant difference in the mean ranks of the groups, 
testing Single Service vs. Joint Service and Single Systems vs. System-of-Systems (SoS). The 
H test is particularly robust as it does not make any assumptions about the underlying 
distribution of the samples.  




























breaches 34.36 49.56 0.0039 38.56 51.31 0.0246 
RDT&E 
breaches 32.44 51.22 0.0002 39.34 49.56 0.0631 
 =
=




breaches 39.14 45.41 0.2244 41.70 44.29 0.6418 
APUC 
breaches 39.60 45.01 0.2633 42.09 43.42 0.7977 
Variables and Definitions 
 
The results reported in Table 1 suggest significantly greater schedule breaches and 
RDT&E cost breaches in SoS than in Single Systems, with a weaker result for Joint Service vs. 
Single Service. The null hypothesis is that there is no significant difference. 
The results overall are consistent, but somewhat weaker considering the difference in 
the average number of breaches between development and production programs using a Mann-
Whitney (U) test (which also makes no assumptions about the underlying distribution of the 
samples). We examined the difference in mean ranks for schedule breaches, cost breaches 
(including RDT&E, procurement, PAUC and APUC) and total breaches.  The results are shown 
in Table 2. 








 Development Production Development Production 
 n=48 n=36 n=48 n=36 
Schedule breaches 0.0104 0.1558 0.0624 0.2126 
Cost breaches 0.0414 0.0225 0.2603 0.5703 
Total 0.0276 0.0289 0.1632 0.4497 
These findings should be interpreted with a note of caution. For example, the limited 
sample, the method for categorizing the degree of interdependence or “jointness” and SoS, and 
the failure to include and control for other important factors may be significant. Though 
preliminary, these results offer evidence to support further investigations on the role of jointness 
and SoS in program acquisition. 
Variable   Variable Definition 
Schedule Breach When schedule exceeds most recent APB schedule estimate 
by six months. 
RDT&E Breach When the program’s research, development, test, and 
evaluation costs exceed 15%. 
PAUC Breach When the Program Acquisition Unit Cost exceeds the most 
recent Acquisition Program Baseline threshold by 15%. This 
is a congressionally reportable breach. 
APUC Breach When the Average Procurement Unit Cost exceeds the most 
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